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RYAN L. DUDLEY*

A Framework for Natural
Resource Management
ABSTRACT
The actual practice of setting up multiple-use natural resource
management on federal lands has been a case of "muddling through."
No overall theoreticalrationaleexists on a nationwide basis. However, it is possible to envision a theoreticalframework for managing
naturalresources based on a politicaleconomy paradigm of market
failurelgovernmentfailure. This paper proposes such a framework
involving three parts. The first identifies resources and areas best
served by private ownership or by public ownership. The second
identifies principles and standards which would guide management.
The third develops the bureaucracy needed to set up and manage
the identified areas. The paper also looks at theoreticalrequirements
for effective implementation of the proposedframework.

INTRODUCTION
This paper is an exercise in applied planning theory which uses various
elements of theory to critique the current rationale supporting natural
resource management on the public lands. The question presented is
whether planning theory can be applied in the real world to design a
framework for natural resource management.
Although the paper often refers to public lands administered by the
United States Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management,
the references are intended as examples to better illustrate the argument
presented. The theory proposed could also apply to lands administered
by other federal agencies, such as the Forest Service or the National Park
Service. In fact, its purpose is to provide a logical rationale for identifying
lands anywhere in the United States that should be considered for management by government agencies. Conversely, the proposed theory also
provides similar rationale for identifying federal lands that should be
considered for non-government management.
*The author is on the staff of the Bureau of Land Management in Washington, D.C. The opinions
expressed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Bureau of
Land Management, and should not be construed as such.
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PART I-RATIONAL PLANNING
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) administers over 270 million
acres of federal lands.' These lands are generally the leftover public
domain never transferred to the private sector or to some other government
agency's jurisdiction. While many forests were reserved for the national
forest system, and many scenic, historical, and recreational lands were
reserved for the national park system, the prairie and other lands suitable
for cultivation were transferred to private ownership. Management of the
remaining lands, which are mostly arid and semi-arid, was left to the
BLM. The BLM, therefore, has jurisdiction over the residual public
domain, and derives its mission from that historical situation.2 The situation came first and the agency based its mission on a rationalization
of the existing situation.
Management planners today must deal with the outcome of this ad hoc
selection method, which resulted from conflicting ideologies and political
influence instead of rational choice.' The lack of effective theoretical
criteria for the selection of public lands led to a haphazard jurisdictional
division of lands. For example, not all forests ended up in the national
forest system. The tall-grass prairie continues as one of the missing links
in the national park system. Many of the wetlands and riparian areas
escaped inclusion in any of the national systems. In addition, there have
been calls to privatize portions of the grazing lands now administered by
the BLM.' The question, then, is whether a more rational approach could
be taken to natural resource management-one which considers whether
specific lands and resources are best managed by the public or by the
private sector. 5
Various approaches have addressed the question of the federal government's jurisdiction and mission in natural resource management. One
example is the now outdated Classification and Multiple Use Act, 6 passed
in 1964 with only temporary authority while Congress studied the public
land laws. 7 The act provided for identification of public lands which
should be retained in federal ownership and recognized that those lands
should be managed for multiple uses.' However, the act addressed only
the leftover public domain.
I. Bureau of Land Management, 1988 Public Land Statistics I (1989).
2. J. Muhn & H. Stuart, Opportunity and Challenge: The Story of BLM II I (1988).
3. Nelson, The Public Lands, in Current Issues in Natural Resource Policy 14 (P Portney ed.
1982).
4. R. Stroup & J. Baden, Natural Resources: Bureaucratic Myths and Environmental Management
(1983).
5. The rational planning model used in this paper is a common but not unique model for environmental intervention. Other models and criticisms are discussed in Andreas Faludi's book, A
Decision-Centred View of Environmental Planning (1987).
6. 43 U.S.C. § 1131 (1964) (expired six months after enactment).
7. J. Muhn & H. Stuart, supra note 2, at I ll.
8. O'Callaghan, The Mining Law and Multiple Use, 7 Nat. Res. J. 242 (1967).
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Another example is the national wilderness preservation system. Congress passed a statute with specific land classification criteria for wilderness areas and directed concerned federal agencies to identify lands that
met the criteria. 9 In this case, the theory of wilderness preservation came
first and served as a guide to locate lands appropriate for wilderness
management. However, potential wilderness areas were only selected
from existing public sector lands.
As shown by these examples, alternatives to the ad hoc land selection
approach do exist for examining the potential jurisdiction and role of
government in natural resource management. Another alternative, proposed in this paper, suggests beginning with a theoretical management
concept and then locating appropriate lands and resources to administer.
This approach is similar to that taken to establish the national wilderness
system discussed above, except that in the proposed approach, non-federal
lands and resources would be examined in conjunction with those in
federal ownership.
In the proposed approach, development of theoretical criteria would
help identify the federal government's proper jurisdiction by eliciting
answers to such questions as:
1. Which lands and resources need special management?
2. Why should such management be done by the public sector?
The criteria would come first and serve as a guide for identifying lands
appropriate for federal jurisdiction as well as for non-federal jurisdiction.
Once lands suitable for federal management were identified, the development of principles and standards to aid in management of the lands
would be considered. The standards currently in effect for federal resource
management are a collection of statutes and concepts developed over the
years in an incremental fashion.'" The only major statute integrating all
BLM-administered resources is the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act of 1976 (FLPMA)," which requires land use plans which consider
all resources.
However, FLPMA is not the basic resource management principle and
standard for individual resources. Frequently, individual resources are
governed by distinct and separate management statutes, only minimally
coordinated or synchronized. " A true multiple resource/multiple use management statute does not currently exist.
Once management standards for individual resources are developed,
the geographic and administrative structure of the government agency
which will manage the identified lands by implementing the principles
9. 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (1964).

10. J.Muhn & H. Stuart, supra note 2; C. Mayer & G. Riley, Public Domain, Private Dominion:
A History of Public Mineral Policy in America (1985).
I. 43 U.S.C. §1701 (1982).
12. J. Muhn & H. Stuart, supra note 2, at 275-92.
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and standards must be designed. The BLM's existing organization was
shaped episodically by events over its history. In particular, the administrative structure used by the BLM today evolved from grazing districts
set up by the Grazing Service in the 1930s. ,3It includes elements traceable
to features of the General Land Office and the Geological Survey's Conservation Division. 4 Other elements resulted from an effort to coordinate
with the Forest Service." Using theoretical concepts from the beginning
should result in a more effective geographic and administrative design
than that existing today.
PART I-FRAMEWORK DESIGN
A rational plan for a natural resource management framework would
have to provide, at the outset, these points:
1. Criteria for identifying lands needing multiple resource management
by the public sector;
2. Generic principles and standards for such management; and,
3. A geographic and administrative structure for such management.
The framework developed here will address each of these points. It will
employ the "market failure/government failure" paradigm used in examining issues of political economy.' 6 The debate over nationalization
versus privatization is a central topic in political economy and scholars
are increasingly using the paradigm as a basis for analysis. 7 The paradigm
thus lends itself to the examination of the continued controversy over
ownership and control of natural resources."
The Market Failure/Government Failure Paradigm
The concept of market failure explains cases where the ordinary exchange of goods and services in the marketplace does not provide an
adequate solution to the question of how to allocate resources.' 9 Several
types of cases where this problem may occur are:
13. Id. at 56.
14. Id. at 56, 228.
15. J. Clarke & D. McCool, Staking Out the Terrain 111-15 (1985).
16. The Land Use Policy Debate in the United States (J. de Neufville ed. 1981); C. Lindblom,
Politics and Markets (1977).
17. See, for example, W. Nothdurft, Renewing America (1984); J.Stiglitz, Economics of the
Public Sector (1986).
18. Other paradigms might be used for analysis. For example, John Dryzek claims that the
dichotomy between government and market choice is highly oversimplified. J.Dryzek, Rational
Ecology: Environment and Political Economy 63 (1987). He proposes a set of nine modes of
coordination which he calls "social choice mechanisms." Id. at 64. He concludes, however, that
"as far as what actually exists is concerned, markets and administered systems probably have the
strongest presence in today's world." Id. at 65.
19. L. Wingo & A. Evans, Public Economics and the Quality of Life (1977).
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1. Natural monopoly, such as the local distribution of electricity or
water;
2. Externality, such as putting smoke in the air or dumping waste in
the river;
3. Collective consumption goods, such as providing for national defense or public health; and
4. Common resource pools, such as fish in the ocean.
In these cases, the marketplace is not apt to provide an effective or efficient
allocation."0
On the other hand, turning the problem over to the government has its
own difficulties. Areas of government failure can include:
I. Bureaucracy, where the bureaucrats look out for their own interests
rather than the public interest;
2. Special interest influence, where logrolling and pork barrel politics
tend to determine resource allocation;
3. Lack of information provided by prices, which becomes a more
acute defect as the size of the organization increases; and
4. Gerrymandering, corruption, and egomania. Who will guard the
guardians?
The concept of government failure is intuitively obvious, but not as
well represented in the literature. For example, William Nothdurft discusses many of the problems identified as government failures in this
paper, but refers to them as defects leading to market failure. 2 Thus, if
the government does not set the proper rules for the market to operate
effectively, Nothdurft classifies it as market failure rather than government
failure. This is understandable when writing from an economist's perspective. Presumably an author addressing the issue from the political
science perspective would concentrate on government failure, although
the term itself would probably not be used.
From the perspective of political economy, a dual failure approach
clarifies and focuses the various concepts of both economics and politics.
The interesting thing about dual failure is that economists generally approach the market failure side first. If evidence of market failure exists,
the tendency is to imply that government should do something. This
implicit assumption is usually not subjected to rigorous analysis. The
economists may feel that such analysis is the proper province of political
scientists.
From a policy standpoint, however, the implicit assumption that a
20. The concept of market failure has been applied to natural resource management. W. Nothdurft,
supra note 17. It is not without controversy, however. For a critique of the "conventional wisdom
notions of market failure," see Randall, The Problem of Market Failure, 23 Nat. Res. J. 131-48
(1983).
21. W. Nothdurft, supra note 17, at 103.
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government mechanism should replace the market is not enough. Policy
analysis examines the various alternatives or options for dealing with an
issue and determines which are better or worse (or at least predicts the
impacts of each). For example, the options for natural resource management include various combinations of market and government mechanisms. A policy study should investigate these combinations to determine
the relative feasibility and effectiveness of each. Results would be presented in terms of the type and degree of market failure along with the
type and degree of government failure. Logic disallows the assumption
that because some market failure exists one should turn to the option of
government ownership (or vice versa). The potential for government
failure may be equally great. It requires a more sophisticated balancing
of failures to select the appropriate course of action. Perhaps this is the
role of planning.
Designing Jurisdictional Criteria
The market failure/government failure paradigm provides a theoretical
basis for identifying lands and resources needing public sector management. In general, these constitute lands and resources where the degree
of market failure is greater than the degree of government failure. For
example, most western coal underlies public lands, while most eastern
coal is located on private lands.2" If coal is subject to significant market
failure, but less government failure, it should be identified for public
sector management. Therefore, we might plan to retain western coal in
government ownership, while seeking to transfer some eastern coal from
the private sector to the government. Of course, analysis might show the
reverse to be the case-that the private sector could manage better. If so,
western coal would be transferred from government ownership to private
ownership.
A second, related step to identifying those resources best managed by
the public sector would be to identify interactions among resources. In
some cases, no feasible way exists to have separate private and government management of resources in the same location. One example might
be a forest that provides both a critical habitat for an endangered species
and an important mineral deposit which could be strip-mined. These
situations would need to be analyzed to determine the feasibility of multiple use management by a single public or private entity.
Designing Principles and Standards
The same rational process would identify principles and standards to

use in managing the natural resources. General principles and standards
22. Department of the Interior, Fiscal Year 1988 Federal Coal Management Report I (1989).
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could be logically derived from the theoretical management concept used
to develop criteria for identifying lands and resources, but could also
include additional concepts.
Charles Howe, for example, provides a list of "guidelines for a responsible natural resource policy": 23
I.The avoidance of irreversibilities in all renewable resource systems;
2. The avoidance of irreversibilities in local ambient environmental
conditions;
3. The avoidance of irreversibilities in the condition of global environmental systems;
4. A clear determination of the role of free markets and prices;
5. Undertaking a program of resource planning at the federal level for
nonrenewable resources, aimed at the perpetuation of a "constant
effective natural resource base"; and
6. Increased long-term support of social and technological research
and development.
In addition to the above, the standards or governing statute ought to
be self-contained and integrated. Ideally, it should not have to be implemented in conjunction with resource-specific statutes written at different
times and with different philosophies in mind. Instead, the governing
statute should incorporate the useful material from such statutes and then
repeal them. Another tactic for preparing standards would eliminate provisions not directly relevant to natural resource management in order to
reduce the number of exceptions and conflicts in policy. For example,
concepts such as special assistance for interest groups would be clearly
separated and described. Perhaps an economic impact statement could be
required which would identify hidden subsidies, or subsidies which have
the greatest potential for assisting relevant groups.
Various agencies' mission statements, resource management statutes,
and academic studies can serve as sources of material to include in the
principles and standards. The experience of the BLM and other similar
agencies can be a source of information about what really works in
practice. In addition, the designers should consider the following desirable
characteristics of standards as they assemble the framework:
1. Neutrality and lack of bias among resources;
2. Comprehensiveness of resource coverage;
3. Timelessness;
4. General applicability to all resources;
5. Comprehensiveness of issue coverage; and
23. C. Howe, Natural Resources Economics: Issues, Analysis, and Policy 335-37 (1979). By
"irreversibilities" Howe means that natural areas frequently cannot be recreated once disturbed by
development. Id. at 316.
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6. Ability to supersede the older individual resource management statutes.
These characteristics lead to the design of the geographic and administrative organization-the natural resource management bureaucracy.
Designing the Geographic and Administrative Structure
Among geographic and administrative issues to consider when designing a bureaucracy to manage resources placed under public ownership
are:
I. The choice of department or independent agency;
2. The choice of having a single agency or dividing the land areas
among two or more;
3. The organization of the land areas into one or more systems;
4. The implication for budgeting; and
5. The organization of personnel.
Currently the management of natural resources is spread among a
number of federal agencies including the Departments of Agriculture,
Commerce, and Interior. Some resources are under the control of the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), an independent agency. This variety
could allow for indirect competition among the agencies to see which
can do the best job of managing. For example, competition might promote
a certain amount of good-natured rivalry in areas such as discovering and
instituting new techniques, and installing modem automated systems and
other equipment.
Another issue for consideration in designing an administrative structure
is whether to organize the land area according to what will be termed in
this paper as the "reservation scenario" or the "wide-open-space scenario." The reservation scenario corresponds to military bases, national
parks, and other discreet areas that have easily identified boundaries,
gates and/or guards, and numerous signs. The wide-open-space scenario
corresponds to the public lands administered by the BLM, and the offshore
resources. Under this scenario, the BLM operated for many years more
like a civilian landlord. Most of the actual activities on the BLM lands,
such as oil drilling, mining, and ranching, were carried out by lessees
or permitees. The BLM mainly checked on compliance with lease terms
and collected rents and royalties. More recently, though, as the BLM has
moved into operating activities such as wild horse management and recreation, and into law enforcement, more personnel have begun wearing
uniforms, more signs have been erected, and other modifications have
been adopted. 4 These indications of the reservation scenario are also
evident in the spread of distinct national conservation areas, national
24. J. Muhn & H. Stuart, supra note 2, at 243-54.
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recreation areas, and areas of critical environmental concern (ACECs). 5
A geographic design should consider the advantages and disadvantages
of each scenario.
Budget and organization issues concern both the internal arrangement
and the geographical scope of the agency. Various organization methods
are possible. One is organizational division by resource with separate
programs and budgets for coal, oil, wildlife, wilderness, and other resources. Another is division by geographic area, such as Alaska, national
conservation areas, ACECs, districts, or ecosystems. A third possibility
is division by function or goal, such as economic development, biological
diversity, revenue enhancement, or historic preservation. Analysis of these
various alternatives would help determine the most appropriate structure
for the overall natural resource management bureaucracy. The analysis
might also indicate a way to arrange budget line items and administrative
programs so that they could be keyed to counteract any tendencies toward
government failure on the part of the managing agency.
In the resulting framework, something like a "National Natural Resources System" would be authorized to function under the jurisdiction
of one or more agencies. Its governing statute would contain criteria and
tests for including lands in the system, principles and standards for managing the lands once they were included, and geographic and administrative specifications.
PART III-IMPLEMENTATION
The proposed natural resource management framework must address
effective implementation by incorporating provisions in the enabling legislation which assure the framework's successful construction and operation. In their book, Implementation and Public Policy,26 Daniel
Mazmanian and Paul Sabatier point out that a variety of factors can either
assure or impede successful implementation. They developed a list of
crucial conditions needed for a statute to achieve its desired goals. Comparing FLPMA27 with this checklist illustrates how an existing statute
coped with effective implementation.
Condition 1: The enabling legislation or other legal directive mandates policy objectives which are clear and consistent or at least
provides substantive criteria for resolving goal conflicts.
FLPMA has a clear statement of policy and provides criteria for resolving goal conflicts. 8 Nevertheless, conflicts are often resolved in favor
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 255-57.
D. Mazmanian & P. Sabatier, Implementation and Public Policy 41-42 (1983).
See infra, note 11.
Id.
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of previous statutes and contrary to the FLPMA declaration of policy.
For example, section 30229 directs BLM to manage the public lands under
principles of multiple use and sustained yield, but then limits the application in the areas of hunting and fishing and mining claims. Section
102'° mandates that the United States receive fair market value for use
of public lands and resources unless otherwise provided by statute. Numerous statutes do provide otherwise, often making it difficult to keep
track of what is due the government. Section 401,"' for example, requires
that grazing fees be set according to what is "equitable" to the United
States and the holders of the grazing permits. The result was that exceptions to the declaration of policy in FLPMA made implementation more
complex and difficult.
Condition 2: The enabling legislation incorporates a sound theory
identifying the principal factors and causal linkages affecting policy
objectives, and gives implementing officials sufficient jurisdiction
over target groups and other points of leverage to attain, at least
potentially, the desired goals.
Section 10232 states that it is the policy of the United States that the
public lands be retained in federal ownership. Thus, right at the start,
FLPMA runs into a problem with incorporating a "sound theory." No
study or theoretical reason explains why all the leftover public domain
as of 1976 should stay in federal ownership. What rationale exists for
having most of the coal west of the Mississippi under federal ownership,
while most of the coal east of the Mississippi is under private ownership?"
What rationale supports federal ownership of most grazing land in Nevada, while most grazing land in Texas is privately owned?34 FLPMA
provides no rationale. No sound theory was incorporated into FLPMA
for deciding whether lands and resources should be nationalized or privatized. Consequently, placement of natural resources in either form of
ownership appears to be arbitrary and capricious.
Condition 3: The enabling legislation structures the implementation
process so as to maximize the probability that implementing officials
and target groups will perform as desired....
Effective implementation of FLPMA was addressed right at the start
in the case of enforcement. The act required the issuance of regulations
to protect the public lands." It also provided several methods of enforce29. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (1982).

30. Id. § 1701(a)(9).
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. § 1751(a).
Id. § 1701(a)(1).
Department of the Interior, supra note 22.
Bureau of Land Management, supra note 1, at 22-23.
43 U.S.C. § 1733(a) (1982).
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ment including civil litigation to prevent any person from violating the
regulations and contracts with local authorities for assistance. a6 In fact,
FLPMA gave the BLM its first general law enforcement authority covering
all public lands. 7 This was a major step forward in terms of implementation.
Condition 4: The leaders of the implementing agency possess substantial managerial and political skill and are committed to statutory
goals.
Before FLPMA, the Director of the BLM was a career civil servant.
The Director's superior, the Assistant Secretary, was a political appointee.
FLPMA not only made the position of Director a political appointment,
but also made it subject to Senate confirmation. 3' This provided the
opportunity to obtain a high degree of political skill in top management.
Condition 5: The program is actively supported by organized constituency groups and by a few key legislators (or a chief executive)
throughout the implementation process, with the courts being neutral
or supportive.
The political and ideological change from the Carter Administration to
the Reagan Administration generated significant controversy over the
management of natural resources." Some groups actively supported retention of public lands, but these were initially the environmental groups
and their allies, including a few key legislators. The changes to public
lands policy after 1976 were viewed negatively by many commodity
groups who had allies and key legislators on their side. After 1980, many
FLPMA supporters were in the uncomfortable position of opposing policies of the agency charged with implementing FLPMA.' This turmoil
probably slowed the implementation of some aspects of FLPMA, such
as land use planning.
Condition 6: The relative priority of statutory objectives is not undermined over time by the emergence of conflicting public policies
or by changes in relevant socio-economic conditions which weaken
the statute's causal theory or political support.
Conflicts, as discussed in the analysis of Condition 5, tended to undermine some of the political support for FLPMA. By 1980, the so-called
Sagebrush Rebellion was in progress. 4' This was a campaign in parts of
36. Id. § 1733(b), (c).
37. J. Muhn & H. Stuart, supra note 2, at 195.

38. 43 U.S.C. § 1731(a) (1982).
39. Barton, Bureau of Land Management, in Audubon Wildlife Report 8-9 (1987).
40. Western Public Lands: The Management of Natural Resources in a Time of Declining Federalism (J. Francis & R. Ganzel eds. 1984).
41. J. Muhn & H. Stuart, supra note 2, at 221.
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the western United States to either turn public lands over to state governments or sell them to private parties. At the same time, the federal
government began an asset management campaign to sell some public
land to help pay the national debt.4" These initiatives conflicted with the
retention policy of FLPMA. Eventually, both the Sagebrush Rebellion
and the asset management program lost support and were abandoned. As
the official BLM history points out:
Many agencies argued that excess properties identified under the
program might be needed under federal ownership in the future.
Conservation groups distrusted the Interior Department's motives in
disposing of federal lands and criticized what they perceived as the
program's broad scope. Most BLM land users, when confronted with
the prospect of purchasing land at fair market value, found they
preferred that the lands remain in public ownership.' 3
The sharp declines in commodity prices (oil, coal, beef) caused political
pressure to swing from capturing revenue for the United States treasury
to finding ways of providing government relief. This further undermined
the fair market value policy stated in FLPMA."
All of these problems in implementation are not surprising, however,
for FLPMA was a product of controversy and compromise. The statute
was not a fresh start with a clean slate. Still, it is worthwhile contemplating
what benefits a fresh start might offer. A theoretical design can often
provide hints for future reform.

PART IV-ILLUSTRATIONS
One of the most basic natural resources is the soil. Cities and civilization
depend on cultivation of the soil for food and fiber. The United States is
blessed with a vast expanse of land suitable for cultivation. Some of this
land, however, is subject to severe erosion by wind and water. The dust
bowl of the 1930s is an important indication of what can happen, and
there have been more instances of severe erosion since then.' 5 One case
study concludes that "soil conservation efforts, therefore, undertake many
individual projects but fail to protect the nation's soil resources."' Thus,
soil furnishes a good example for illustrating features of the proposed
management framework.
Id. at 221-22.
id. at 222.
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
S. Batie, Soil Erosion xiii (1983).
46. Browne & Meier, Choosing Depletion: Soil Conservation andAgricultural Lobbying, in Scarce
Natural Resources 273 (S. Welch & R. Miewald eds. 1983).
42.
43.
44.
45.
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The Buffalo Commons
The high rate of soil erosion in conjunction with other physical and
economic factors has led two authors to foresee dire consequences for
the Great Plains. Deborah and Frank J. Popper predict "that over the
next generation the Plains will, as a result of the largest, longest running
agricultural and environmental miscalculation in American history, become almost totally depopulated." 47 Their argument is based on a list of
failures:
The Homestead Act and the succeeding federal land subsidies for
settlers amounted to attempts to privatize the Plains, to take them
out of the federal domain and put them permanently in individual or
corporate hands. Today's subsidies for crops, water, and grazing land
amount to attempts to buttress the privatization. But private interests
have proved unable to last long on the Plains. Responding to nationally based market imperatives, they have overgrazed and overplowed the land and overdrawn the water. Responding to the usually
increasing federal subsidies, they have overused the natural resources
the subsidies provided. They never created a truly stable agriculture
or found reliable conservation devices. In some places, private owners supplemented agriculture with inherently unstable energy and
mineral development."
The Poppers claim that drought will inevitably return, that the aquifers
are running dry, and that the desertification in many areas is already
severe.49 They say that agriculture on the Great Plains is often unprofitable
and federal subsidies seem inadequate to keep private interests afloat, so
that "much of the Plains will inexorably suffer near-total desertion over
the next generation."'
When the Great Plains reach this stage, the Poppers contend,
the only way to keep the Plains from turning into an utter wasteland,
an American Empty Quarter, will be for the federal government to
step in and buy the land-in short, to deprivatize it ....

The federal

government's commanding task on the Plains for the next century
will be to recreate the nineteenth century, to re-establish what we
would call the Buffalo Commons ....

The Buffalo Commons will

become the world's largest historic preservation project, the ultimate
national park."'
47. Popper & Popper, The Great Plains: From Dust to Dust, 53 Plan. 12 (Dec. 1987).
48. Id. at 16.
49. Id.at 15.
50. Id. at 17.
51. Id. at 17-18. Note that the dictionary definition of "commons" is "a piece of land subject
to common use: as undivided land used especially for pasture." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary 266 (9th ed. 1983). Public land on the Great Plains was a commons prior to the establishment of federal grazing districts. Anderson & Hill, From Free Grass to Fences: Transforming

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 30

As for effective implementation of such a scheme, the authors suggest
an agency like the TVA or the BLM, but with much broader powers.52

The Buffalo Commons is a serendipitous example of using rational
planning to solve a natural resource problem. It has some parallels to the
framework suggested in this paper, such as the importance of analyzing

the reasons for government intervention, and illustrates that others have
used a somewhat similar theoretical analysis to identify lands suitable for
BLM-type jurisdiction. 3
Although the Poppers claim that a number of inappropriate policies by
the government have exacerbated the dust bowl problem,54 more analysis
is needed concerning public sector versus private sector ownership to
determine which is best. They argue that on the lands that were privatized
by homesteading, private interests only continue by means of federal
subsidies. 5 If subsidies are inappropriate, they appear to result from
government failure due, perhaps, to interest group lobbying. The remedy
would ordinarily be to stop the subsidies, rather than to change ownership,
unless this is a special case where government ownership could counteract
government failure.
The Poppers have advanced a scenario based on a theoretical discussion
of government intervention. Their proposal offers an opportunity for additional research to develop the actual jurisdiction, standards, and adminthe Commons of the American West, in Managing the Commons 200-16 (G. Hardin & J. Baden eds.
1977). The districts were largely established to remedy the problem of serious overgrazing under
the commons arrangement. J. Muhn & H. Stuart, supra note 2 at, 35-37. In other words, the original
Great Plains commons was unsatisfactory, at least after the arrival of non-Indians. It was partially
privatized as a response. The portion not privatized was changed from a commons to a system of
leases, licenses, and permits. Anderson & Hill, supra at 208. Consequently, the name "Buffalo
Commons" is probably not quite appropriate. In a commons any citizen can hunt or fish at pleasure,
or can graze animals at will. The envisioned Buffalo Commons might not be an actual commons,
but rather a very large range where buffalo could roam under restrictive conditions. In the absence
of natural enemies, the buffalo might have their numbers kept in check by man-made methods. In
any event, solutions would need to be found for problems similar to those in the national parks.
Critics point out that national park status solves some problems, but creates many new ones. The
raging controversies over whether to let natural fires bum, whether to bring back wolves, whether
to remove excess elk, how to protect grizzly bears, and what to do with automobiles show that
government ownership is no panacea. See, The Yosemite Crush, The International Herald Tribune,
Aug. 19-20, 1989, at 14; For Yellowstone Bears. Nature Works, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1989; A
Wolf's Best Friend May Yet Turn Out to Be Man, Washington Post, Aug. 23, 1989, at A3.
52. Popper & Popper, supra note 47, at 18.
53. The discussion of the problems of the Great Plains is not merely an academic exercise. The
Buffalo Commons has sparked public interest. For example, The Washington Post printed a shortened
version of the Poppers' article, as well as a rebuttal by a congressman from Kansas. Saving the
Plains: The Bison Gambit, Washington Post, Aug. 6, 1989, at B3; Buffaloed, Washington Post,
Aug. 12, 1989, at A17. This exchange was followed by a front page feature story in the Wall Street
Journal which makes it clear that numerous areas on the Great Plains are literally going back to
nature. On the Great Plains, Life Becomes a Fightfor Water and Survival, Wall Street Journal, Aug.
16, 1989, at I.
54. Popper & Popper, supra note 47, at 14.
55. Id. at 16.
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istration, perhaps using a rational planning approach like that set forth
in this paper. Unfortunately, we are faced with "a choice between imperfect markets and imperfect governments, as well as imperfect combinations between them."'56
Soil Erosion Management
Although the Poppers' article discussed only the Great Plains, soil
erosion plagues many parts of the United States. The Soil Conservation
Service (SCS) has identified six serious erosion areas in the United States:57
1. The Palouse dryfarming area in Washington, Oregon, and Idaho;
2. The hard red wheat lands in southeastern Idaho;
3. The cotton and grain sorghum lands in the Texas Blackland Prairie;
4. The cropland in the Southern Mississippi Valley;
5. The Corn Belt States; and
6. The potato lands in Aroostook County, Maine.
Unlike the Great Plains, which suffer from severe wind erosion, these
areas are primarily threatened by water erosion." The existing institutional
framework has not solved this serious problem after more than 50 years;
a new framework is surely needed.
The Conservation Foundation, in a study of soil erosion, identified
eight alternatives for action.59 These were: education; technical assistance;
economic incentives; economic disincentives; regulation; public ownership; demand management; and reduction of exports. Public sector ownership was only one of the eight possible solutions. This emphasizes the
need for relatively sophisticated analyses of the erosion issue in order to
identify areas where public sector ownership would be the remedy of
choice. The same is true of resources other than soil.
In addition to severe soil erosion, the Soil Conservation Service lists
other soil and water related problems, including the condition of nonfederal forest lands, unreclaimed abandoned coal mines, significant losses
of wetlands and bottomland hardwood forests, inadequate surface water
supplies, significant groundwater overdrafts, frequent floods, and sediment and salinity pollution.' This paper's approach would pinpoint geographic areas where many of these problems occur together. Then, the
institutional framework would be adjusted through market failure/government failure analysis. Other natural resources such as air, vegetation,
animals, energy and minerals could be examined in a similar manner,
with the goal of more effective management.
56.
57.
58.
59.

C. Wolf, Jr., Markets or Governments xiii (1988).

Soil Conservation Service, America's Soil and Water: Condition and Trends 9 (1981).
Id. at 8.
S. Batie, supra note 45, at 113.

60. Soil Conservation Service, supra note 62, at 11-32.
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CONCLUSION

This paper suggests developing a new framework for natural resource
management based on the political economy paradigm. Applied research
to determine the feasibility of this framework should be undertaken.
Although it is not realistic to expect Congress to radically rearrange the
ownership patterns of the nation, some readjustments could proceed.
Applied research and development projects could provide benefits immediately, even without a large-scale change in ownership. For example,
a model statute could be designed and drafted to provide inclusive management principles for areas with multiple resources and resource uses.
Even a theoretical fresh start can point the way to future improvement.

